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Abstract 
 
This study examines the influence of culture on Corporate Governance 
Statement disclosure in the annual reports of the major airline companies in 
Malaysia and Australia. The cultural research of Hofstede (1980) and the 
accounting value dimensions of Gray (1988) imply that Malaysian Airlines, 
from a large power distance country, will disclose less Corporate 
Governance Statement information in their annual report than Qantas 
Airlines, from a small power distance country. The results obtained from a 
comparison of the differences showed Malaysian Airlines disclosing more 
pieces of additional information in certain areas than Qantas Airlines and 
vice versa. However, the net result was that Qantas Airlines provided more 
pieces of additional information than Malaysia Airlines. This result supports 
Hofstede (1980) and Gray (1988). The implication for regulators of both 
countries is that while these culturally different countries do not disclose 
completely identical information they both suggest fruitful areas of 
additional corporate governance disclosure.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate Governance can be defined as the set of institutional arrangements effecting 
corporate decision making (Ball, 1998). An alternative definition of Corporate Governance is 
that it deals with the “relationship among various participants in determining the direction and 
performance of corporations” (Monks and Minnow 1995, p1). 
 
Research into corporate governance is topical because attention in recent years has 
focussed on this area due to some very high profile collapses of companies like Enron and 
WorldCom in the USA, Vivendi (France), Centrika (UK), Tyco International (Bermuda), 
Shell (UK/Netherlands) (Saudagaran, 2003), and One.Tel, Ansett, and Harris Scarfe in 
Australia (Bazley, Hancock, Berry and Jarvis, 2004).  
 
The impact of corporate failures amid evidence of executive malpractice, at 
worst, and carelessness at best, has provided regular copy for the print and 
visual media over recent years, forcing a questioning of the self-regulatory 
approach to corporate behaviour that has been popularised over the past 
twenty years (Callendar, Jamieson and Williams, 2004, Preface v).   
 
Saudagaran (2003) in his summary of the lessons learned from these failures emphasises the 
need for stronger governance structures. The promulgation of the code of corporate 
governance by the respective country’s regulators and the consequent compliance to the letter 
and spirit of such codes by corporations are the means toward stronger governance structures. 
 
This background of turmoil in corporate governance provides the motivation for this 
study. The aim of which is to constructively compare and analyse the contents of the 
Corporate Governance Statement (CGS) in the annual report of companies in two countries 
considered to be culturally different (Hofstede, 1980), Malaysia and Australia. The general 
proposition of this study is that Malaysian firms will provide less information in their CGS 
than Australian firms.       
 
We consider this study to be important for several reasons. First, we believe that this is 
the first study that compares CGS disclosure in its entirety across national boundaries. 
Second, regulators of governance disclosure will find the results useful as they are informed    2
    
 
   
on CGS disclosure in another environment. Therefore, areas where governance disclosure 
may be improved is highlighted and at zero cost for this information. Thirdly, users including 
analysts and fund managers may find differences useful and may request more and/or 
alternative forms of disclosure.  Consequently, this study extends the range of studies, as 
indicated in the next section, on corporate governance disclosure.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Some recent Australian and 
Malaysian literature is indicated in Section 2, while Section 3 sets out the theoretical 
framework and develops the research proposition. Section 4 outlines the country selection, 
industry selection, sample and data source, and research design. Section 5 reports the results 
of the comparison and analysis, followed by Section 6 that concludes the research, details 
some limitations of the research, implications of the results, and indicates further research 
direction. 
 
2. Prior  Research 
 
There does not appear to have been any published research internationally that is 
directly comparable with the present study. That is, comparison of CGSs across countries. 
The research has focussed on areas (sections) of corporate governance but not a total 
governance approach. Recent corporate governance studies on Malaysia that focus on areas of 
corporate governance include those by Fan and Wong (2003), Hassan, Christopher and Evans 
(2003), Rahman and Haniffa (2003), Tan (2003), Thompson, Hung and Pei (2003), and 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002). Recent studies in Australia include those by Cullen and 
Christopher (2002a), Cullen and Christopher (2002b), and Christopher and Cullen (2003). 
Because the research undertaken in Malaysia and Australia was not directly relevant to the 
present study an analysis of these studies was not deemed necessary.  
 
3.  Theoretical Framework and Proposition 
 
3.1 Theoretical  Framework 
 
Hofstede (1980, p25) defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one human group from another”. He found four dimensions 
which seemed to distinguish one culture from another. He called these dimensions    3
    
 
   
Individualism versus Collectivism, Large versus Small Power Distance, Strong versus Weak 
Uncertainty Avoidance, and Masculinity versus Femininity, Subsequently, Hofstede and 
Bond (1988) found a fifth dimension that related to China that they termed Confucianism. 
 
Hofstede’s work is acknowledged as “one of the most extensive cross-cultural surveys 
conducted …” (Radebaugh and Gray, 1992 p67) and the definitions of culture and the 
dimensions he proposed are in broad agreement with those identified in other social science 
literature and other subsequent researchers (Gray and Verma, 1998). Testimony to the 
recognition of Hofstede’s findings in respect of culture is the considerable amount of research 
in alternative settings and disciplines which have used his work as the theoretical foundation 
for their research.  
 
We consider the dimension most relevant to the present study is Large versus Small 
Power distance. In a large power distance society there is an acceptance of a hierarchical 
order in which everybody has a place, whereas in a small power distance society people strive 
for power equalisation. In a large power distance society subordinate consultation may not be 
as important as in a small power distance society. In low power distance societies 
subordinates expect to be both consulted and able to express their views. This is not the case 
for high power distance societies. 
 
Hofstede (1980) computed the power distance index on the basis of the country mean 
scores for the three questions: 
 
(a)  Non-managerial employees’ perception that employees are afraid to disagree with their 
managers. 
(b)  Subordinates’ perception that their boss tends to take decisions in an autocratic or 
persuasive/paternalistic way. 
(c)  Subordinates’ preference for anything but a consultative style of decision-making in 
their boss: that is, for an autocratic, persuasive/paternalistic, or a democratic style. 
 
The power distance scores for Malaysia and Australia are 106 and 36 respectively. On the 
basis of these scores Hofstede classified Australia as a low power distance country and 
Malaysia a high power distance country. This classification is supported by the evidence of a    4
    
 
   
study that examined the perceived level of participation in budgetary setting by Malaysian and 
Australian managers (Hassan, Christopher and Evans, 2000). 
 
Gray (1988) drawing on the work of Hofstede designed a framework which linked 
culture with accounting values. He suggested four accounting value dimensions that could 
influence a nation’s financial reporting practices. These dimensions are: 
 
(a)  Professionalism versus statutory control  
(b)  Uniformity versus flexibility 
(c)  Conservatism versus optimism  
(d)  Secrecy versus transparency 
 
Gray (1988) considered high power distance societies likely to be characterised by the 
restriction of information (secrecy) to preserve power inequalities existing in those societies. 





The theoretical framework described leads to the following proposition. 
 
P1:  In Malaysia, a high power distance country, the corporate governance statement 
contained in an annual report of a company will contain less information than the 
corporate governance statement in the annual report of a company in Australia, a 
low power distance country.   




4.1   Country Selection 
 
Malaysia and Australia were selected because they were included in Hofstede’s culture 
study and fulfil Hofstede’s criteria of a large power distance country and a small power 
distance country.     5
    
 
   
4.2 Industry  Selection 
 
The airline industry was selected for the study for a number of reasons. The airline 
industry is truly international and this permits further research with other countries. The 
industry is unique, and importantly the significance of that industry both in terms of the 
resources and human capital required for it to operate and to a country in its economic 
development.   
 
4.3   Sample and Data Source 
 
The sample of the study was the major airline companies in Malaysia and Australia for 
the 2003 period. The selection of this time period ensued that the latest possible and available 
data were analysed. The companies selected in the sample were Malaysian Airlines and 
Qantas Airlines because they are the largest single airlines in their respective countries; in fact 
they are considered as the respective countries’ national carriers and ambassadors of the 
nations. Data were extracted from the annual reports of the sample companies. An alternative 
approach to data source would have been to compare the regulations of both countries. 
However, the current approach was adopted because companies may disclose less than 
required or alternatively voluntarily disclose more information than required by the regulatory 
bodies (Choi and Meek (2005).  
  
4.4   Research Design 
 
A qualitative comparison and constructive analysis of the CGSs for Malaysian Airlines 
and Qantas Airlines were made. From this qualitative analysis a judgmental decision was 
made as to whether the proposition that the Malaysian airline was providing less governance 
information than the Australian airline was either accepted or rejected. The criteria used to 
test the proposition were more additional pieces of information in specified areas of the CGS 
in the annual report of one airline in comparison to the other airline. No weighting was 
attached to the information disclosed in the CGS.   
 
    6
    
 
   
5.  Results and Analysis 
 
5.1   Results 
 
Table 1 reports selected characteristics of the two airlines and the overall descriptive 
analysis of the companies’ CGSs. A review of Table 1 supports the earlier claim of the 
importance of these companies in the industry both in terms of the resources and human 
capital employed. With regard to the CGS, an analysis of Table 1 seems to suggest that in 
terms of quantity as measured by the number of pages and words used in the CGS, Malaysian 
Airlines seem to be disclosing more than its counterpart Qantas Airlines. However, both 
companies’ CGSs Flesch Reading Ease Scores suggest that they are considered very difficult 
reading material; readable only to those who have attained college / tertiary education 
(Courtis and Hassan, 2002; Courtis, 1995). The evidence presented in Table 1 in no way 
indicates the differential amount of information contained in the CGS of these two airlines. In 
order to assess the differential amount of information of the CGS, a qualitative comparison 
and constructive analysis are performed and discussed next.  
 







Firm characteristics:    
- Total Revenue (‘000)  MYR 8,894,343  AUD 11,374,900 
- Return on Equity (%)  12.9  8.9 
- Earnings per Share  MYR 0.39  AUD 0.20 
- No. of employees  21,916  34,872 
- No. of passenger carried  16,325,000  16,789,000 
    
Corporate Governance Statement    
- No. of pages  13 pages  4 pages 
- No. of words  5,949 words  2,672 words 
- Flesch Reading Ease Score*:    
      - Main CGS  25.43  24.76 
      - Audit Committee Report  26.10  n.a. 
      - Statement on Internal Control  22.20  n.a. 
*   The Flesch formula is: Reading Ease = 206.835 - 0.846wl - 1.015sl, where wl equals the number of 
syllables per 100 words and sl equals average sentence length. It is predicted that the writing is more 
incomprehensible the closer a score is to zero. Scores are compared against predetermined standards.  
Scores above 50 assume that the message has been written in a manner that makes it comprehensible to 
the majority of readers. Scores between 30-50 indicate that the reading material is classified as difficult, 
and scores between 0-30 indicate the material to be classified as very difficult. Scores below 50 predict 
that the fluent comprehension of the writing is restricted to those who have attained some university 
education (Courtis and Hassan, 2002; Courtis, 1995). 
    7
    
 
   
The results of the comparison of the CGSs of Malaysia Airlines and Qantas Airlines 
appear in Table 2. The comment column in this table indicated a similarity with two items 
(Item 5. Board Meetings, and Item 12. Shareholders); a range of similar items and with some 
of this disclosure elsewhere in the annual report of Qantas Airlines in comparison to 
Malaysian Airlines; some items in Malaysian Airlines that appeared to be duplication; and the 
remaining items dissimilar. The result implied considerable dissimilarity between the CGSs of 




The constructive analysis of differences in the CGSs of both airlines is contained in 
Table 3. The item order shown in Table 2 was reordered to be more logical.  Then, items 
considered related were grouped together. This resulted in three groups and ten single items. 
One group containing items 6, 16 and 17, the second group items 12 and 13, and the third 
group items 14, 15 and 18. The analysis indicated Qantas Airlines (Malaysian Airlines) had 
seven (two) more additional pieces of information than Malaysian Airlines (Qantas Airlines). 
On the basis of the criteria described in the research design to test the proposition formulated 
on the theoretical framework of Hofstede, the proposition P1 was accepted. This did not 
imply that the CGS of Qantas Airlines was superior to that of Malaysian Airlines; rather 
Qantas Airlines had a greater amount of CGS disclosure. An examination of the analysis 
contained in Table 3 suggest regulators of annual report disclosure in both countries may 
stand to gain if all or some of the differences between the airlines were to be adopted in their 
CGS, or at the very least given consideration for inclusion. It seems useful knowledge can be 
gained from a comparison and analysis of CGSs in other environments.         8
    
 
 
Table 2:  Comparison of Corporate Governance Statement in Annual Report 
 
ITEM* Malaysian  Airlines  Qantas  Airlines  COMMENT 
1.   Authority For Corporate 
Governance 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
and Kuala Lumpur (KLSE) Stock 
Exchange listing requirements. 
 
Australian Stock Exchange Corporate 
Governance Council’s Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance. 
Source of authority differs. 
2. Board Responsibilities  The Board’s principal focus is the overall 
strategic direction, development and 
control. Key matters such as approval of 
business plans, major capital expenditure, 
and key human resource policies.  
A broad outline of the Board governance 
objectives. For example, promotes ethical 
and responsible decision-making. A copy of 
the Board Charter will be available on the 
Corporate governance section of the Qantas 
website.  
 
Malaysian airlines stated board 
responsibilities appears to focus more on 
operational aspects as opposed to 
governance disclosure by Qantas. 
3. Board Structure  The names and Board composition of the 
directors; committee memberships; a 
statement that independent non-executive 
directors are independent of management; 
and reference to separate pages for  
Directors’ profiles.  
   
The number and name of the directors; 
criteria for independence; 
the mix of positions; how directors 
appointed; and reference to separate pages 
for details of their qualifications and tenure. 
Qantas provides written criteria as a 
measure of director independence.  
4. Provisions    Details of the constitution provisions of 
Qantas. For example, location of head office 
and proportion of directors to be Australian 
citizens. 
 
No comparable disclosure by Malaysian 
Airlines. 
5. Board Meetings  Twelve board meetings held in this 
financial year with two additional special 
meetings with specific strategic agenda. A 
record of number of meetings attended by 
each director. 
Eight formal meetings a year with additional 
meetings held as required. A two-day 
meeting each year to approve strategy and 
financial plan for next year. Attendance of 
directors at board meetings. 
 
No apparent difference in this item. 
6. Committees  Committees established and their 
authority. Board Audit Committee, 
Nomination Committee, Remuneration 
Committee and Board Safety and Security 
Committee. The memberships of each of 
the committees are shown. 
Committees, membership and their 
responsibility. Audit Committee, Chairman’s 
Committee, Safety, Environment & Security 
Committee and Nominations Committee. 
Qantas includes environment as part of a 
committee.    9
    
 
 
7.   Provision  of Directors’ 
Continuous Education 
All the directors have attended and 
successfully completed the Mandatory 
Accreditation Programme conducted by 
the Research Institute of Investment 
Analysts Malaysia, an affiliate of the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
Also, external speakers were invited to a 
Strategic Planning session to share and 
update the board. Malaysia Airlines held a 
worldwide business forum.  
 
  No comparable disclosure by Qantas. 
8. Remuneration  A Remuneration Committee review, assess 
and recommend to the Board of Directors 
remuneration packages. The Board 
provides total remuneration by categories 
ie Executive and Non-Executive. 
Remuneration Policy is contained in an 
attachment (this includes concessionary 
travel benefits, service payments and other 
retention tools); Reference to pages 
containing remuneration of top five 
executives; benefits. 
The Malaysian Board opts not to disclose 
the remuneration by individual director as 
suggested by the Best Practice of the 
Code. They believe, at this juncture, that 
the information will not add significantly 
to the understanding and evaluation of the 
Group’s governance. 
 
9. Re-election of Directors  Requirements of the Company’s Articles 
of Association are stated. 
  In Australia, this information would be 
included in the annual report as part of 
the agenda of the Annual General 
Meeting. 
 
10. Standards  Each director has full access to all 
information within the group collectively 
or individually. They are entitled and have 
direct access to the advice and services of 
the Group’s Company Secretary. 
 
Examples are: annual review of Board 
performance; active participation by all 
directors at all meetings; open access to all 
information; regular management 
presentations and visits to interstate/offshore 
operations. 
 
Malaysia Airlines has no Standards 
Section. 
11. External Auditor 
Independence 
  The Board and Audit Committee closely 
monitors the independence of the external 
auditors. For example, requires rotation of 
the audit partner every five years and 
policies to restrict the type of non-audit 
services. 
 
No comparable disclosure by Malaysian 
Airlines.    10
    
 
 
12. Shareholders  The Annual General Meeting is the 
principal forum for dialogue with 
shareholders. All directors are available to 
provide responses to questions from the 
shareholders during the meeting.   
Indicates that that their Shareholder 
Communication Policy promotes  
effective communication with shareholders 
and encourages effective participation at 
general meetings. 
Reference that the formal policy will be 
available on the Qantas website.  
 
No apparent difference in this item. 
13. Dialogue with Investors  Briefings with analysts and the media after 
quarterly results announced. Special 
briefings with analysts and media on any 
special development. Briefings with 
institutional investors when required.  
 
  Qantas has no similar announcement. 
14. Financial Reporting  Ensures groups quarterly reports to KLSE 
present a fair assessment. The Audit 
committee assists the Board with such 
reports and quality of reporting.  
  In Australia, fair reporting is a 
requirement of Corporations Law.  
Appears in part to be a duplication of 
Directors Statement. The assistance given 
by the Audit Committee appears to be a 
duplication of their stated role (See role 
of Audit Committee).  
  
15. Statement of Directors 
Responsibility in Relation 
to Accounts 
Refers to other pages on preparation of 
financial statements – i.e., appropriate 
accounting policies; prudent judgment and 
estimates; and applicable approved 
accounting standards followed. Maintains 
records to support the financial position. 
    
  This statement seems to duplicate matters 
contained in other parts of the annual 
report.  
 
Qantas would include this in their 
directors’ Report. 
16. Internal Control  Refer to later pages (two pages) containing 
a detailed Statement on Internal Control.  
  The monitoring of risk management is 
reported by Qantas as part of the duties of 
the Audit Committee (see Committees). 
The difference is that Malaysia Airlines 
provides detailed information – but not in 
the CGS.  
 
 
    11
    
 
 
17. Relationship with Auditor  Appropriate relationship with Group’s 
auditors through the Board Audit 
Committee. Refer to a later page which 
details the Board Audit Committees 
Report. 
 
  This section appears to be a duplication of 
the duties of the Board Audit Committee. 
18. Additional Compliance 
Information (KLSE) 
Listing Requirements  
Variation of Results. 
 




Utilisation of Proceeds from Redeemable 








Share Buy Back. 
 
American Depository Receipt (ADR) or 
Global Depository Receipt (GDR) 
Programme. 
  Disclosures listed in this item do not 





















Table 3:  Constructive Analysis of Differences of Corporate Governance Statement 
in the Annual Report 
 
ITEM ANALYSIS 
1.  Authority  Presently the source of authority differs between the two countries,  
however, Australia through its Corporate Law Economic Review 





The details of the constitution provisions provided by Qantas but not by 
Malaysian Airlines are most informative and useful. 
10.  Standards*   Malaysian Airlines do not appear to have formally considered overall 
board governance responsibilities (standards). 
  
2.  Board Responsibilities*  Malaysian Airlines disclosure does not appear to focus on governance 
per se but rather more on daily duties (tasks). 
  
8.  Board Remuneration*  Qantas provides more information as it discloses the remuneration of the 
top five executives whereas the Malaysian Board has opted to disregard 
their own Best Code of Practice. 
  
3.  Board Structure*  The written criteria that Qantas provides as a measure of independence is 
useful information and an improvement on merely stating, as Malaysian 
Airlines do, that the directors are independent. 
 
5.  Board Meetings  Identical information by both airlines. 
 
6.  Committees* 
16. Internal Control 
17. Relationship with Auditor 
   
The inclusion of Qantas Airlines of Environment together in a committee 
with Safety and Security appears to be a desirable addition in that 
committee.  However, clarification on this aspect is desirable.  No 
apparent differences in items 16 and 17. 
 
7.   Provision of Directors’ 
Continuous Education** 
This disclosure and procedure by Malaysian Airlines is desirable. 
   
9.  Re-election of Directors  No differences in this item other than the place of disclosure. 
 
12.  Shareholders 
13.  Dialogue with Investors** 
The extension of communication by Malaysian Airlines to include 
investors, media and institutional investors is a good policy and can only 
benefit the organisation.  
 
11. External Auditor 
Independence* 
This policy by Qantas Airlines of monitoring the external auditor is 
extremely important as independence is considered to be the cornerstone 
of the auditing profession. Malaysian Airlines would be wise to follow or 
if they do to explicitly state that they do. 
 
14. Financial Reporting 
15. Statement of Directors 
Responsibility in Relation to 
Accounts 
18. Additional Compliance 
Information   (KLSE) 
Listing Requirements  
     
Items 14, 15 and 18 are accounting requirements as opposed to strictly 
governance-related disclosure. 
*  Additional information provided by Qantas Airlines 
**Additional information provided by Malaysian Airlines 
 
 





The aim of the study was to constructively compare and analyse the contents of the 
CGS in two countries, Malaysia and Australia, ascertained by Hofstede to be culturally 
different. The comparison was undertaken between Malaysian Airlines and Qantas Airlines 
from the information contained in their 2003 Annual Report. The general proposition of the 
study was that Malaysian corporations would provide less information in the CGS than 
Australian corporations.   
 
We found that the additional number of pieces of information provided in a number of 
areas in the CGS by Qantas Airlines (Malaysian Airlines) to be greater (less) than that 
provided by Malaysian Airlines (Qantas Airlines). Consequently, we conclude from the 
content analysis that the proposition of the study was accepted.  
 
The study has a number of limitations. The comparison was in a single industry and, 
therefore, other industries should be considered to ascertain if the results are generalisable. 
Further, the disclosure areas were not weighted and an unweighted index is considered to 
have disadvantages (Coy, Tower and Dixon, 1991; Marston and Shrives, 1991). While the 
comparison and content analysis was performed by the cu-author and validated by the 
principal author, Krippendorff (1980) considers it desirable that two or more researchers do 
the analysis independently and compare their results, as a reliability check.       
 
The implication of the results is twofold. First, the results suggest, that while countries 
worldwide are experiencing problems with corporate governance, different cultures will 
develop different corporate governance disclosure strategies. Second, for regulators of annual 
report information in both Malaysia and Australia the results suggest additional fruitful 
disclosure within areas of the CGS. 
 
The method employed in the study and the limitations indicated earlier provide further 
avenues for research. For example, the study could be replicated in a range of similar and 
diverse cultural environments and industries to further test the work of Hofstede (1980) and 
Gray (1988) and to assess generalisability of the findings. In addition, to overcome the 
limitation of using an unweighted index and as a basis of comparison, important users of 
financial statements, such as financial analysts and bankers, could be asked to weight the    14
 
 
different pieces of information contained in the CGS. This may provide insight into the 
relative importance of information and as a consequence assist regulators in providing 
appropriate type and weighting of decision-useful information.    
 
In conclusion, our study provides further evidence in support of Hofstede’s theory 
containing indexes of culture, and hence Gray’s accounting value dimension of Secrecy 
versus Transparency, as well as contributing to the literature in this area.   
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